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Federalism and Property Rights
Ilya Somint

INTRODUCTION

Both the Supreme Court and leading legal scholars have cited federalism as a reason to severely limit judicial enforcement
of constitutional property rights. In Kelo v City ofNew London,'
probably the most controversial property rights decision in Supreme Court history, Justice John Paul Stevens's majority opinion argued that "the needs of society have varied between different parts of the Nation," thereby justifying "a strong theme of
federalism [in the Court's property rights jurisprudence], emphasizing the 'great respect' that we owe to state legislatures and
state courts in discerning local public needs." 2 Similarly, the
Court cited federalism concerns as justification for its ruling in
San Remo Hotel v City & County of San Francisco,3 a decision
that makes it extremely difficult to bring takings claims in federal court.4
Leading scholars such as Robert Ellickson, Thomas Merrill,
Frank Michelman, and Roderick Hills have made similar claims,
arguing that respect for federalism and diverse local needs justit Associate Professorof Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful
suggestions and comments, I would like to thank Roderick Hills, David Schleicher, Lior
Strahilevitz, Eugene Volokh, the editors of The University of Chicago LegalForum, and
participants in the Levy workshop at George Mason University and The University of
Chicago Legal Forum 2010 Symposium on Governance and Power. I would also like to
thank Desiree Mowry and Eric Facer for helpful research assistance.
1 545 US 469 (2005).
2 Id at 482, quoting Hairston v Danville & Western R Co, 208 US 598, 606-07
(1908). Compare David L Callies, Kelo v. City of New London: OfPlanning,Federalism,
andaSwitch in Time, 28 U Hawaii L Rev 327,328 (2006) (arguing that Kelo represents a
"shift in favor of federalism" by the liberal wing of the Court) with Mark Fenster, The
Takings Clause, Version 2005: The LegalProcessOf ConstitutionalPropertyRights, 9 U
Pa J Const L 667,719-26 (2007) (arguing that Kelo and other recent decisions deferring
to state governments on property rights issues cannot be explained by federalism considerations because the Court is equally deferential in cases involving the federal government).
3 545 US 323 (2005).
4 Id at 346-47.
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fies a policy of judicial deference on property rights issues.5 Defenders of the federalism rationale for judicial deference make
two key arguments. One is based on "competitive federalism"the idea that abuses of property rights by state or local governments will be curbed by interjurisdictional competition.6 The
other is the superior knowledge and expertise of state and local
governments in catering to the diverse needs of their communities.7
In this article, I criticize both claims. In Part I, I contend
that competitive federalism is unlikely to provide effective protection for property rights in land because property is an immobile asset. People who "vote with their feet" by leaving a jurisdiction cannot take their land with them. For this crucial reason,
interjurisdictional competition is unlikely to effectively protect
property rights in land, though it may be more useful in the case
of rights to mobile property. Defenders of the competitive federalism argument obviously realize that much property is immobile.
But they have failed to sufficiently consider the significance of
this fact.
Part II takes up the issue of diversity and expertise. While
state and local governments may indeed have greater expertise
5 For examples of such arguments, see generally Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism
andKelo:A Question forRichardEpstein,44 Tulsa L Rev 751 (2009); Roderick Hills, Jr.,
How Federalsm Inevitably 7umps Taking Doctri2e-And a Good Thing Too,
Prawfsblawg (June 18, 2010), online at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/20
10/06/how-federalism-inevitably-trumps-takings-doctrine-1.html (visited Sept 9, 2011);
Roderick Hills, Jr., The IndividualRightto Federalsmin the Rehnquist Court,74 Geo
Wash L Rev 888, 891-92 (2006) (interpreting and defending Kelo and other recent Supreme Court property rights decisions as examples of deference to "federalism"); The Keb
Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property, Hearing before the
US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, 1st Sess 14, 16 (2005) (testimony of
Professor Thomas A. Merrill, Columbia University School of Law) ("Merrill Testimony"
hereinafter) (asserting that federal action regarding public-use issues is an area where it
is important to "remember the issues of federalism and not impose a one-size-fits-all
limitation"); Frank I. Michelman, Property,Federalism, andJurisprudence:A Comment
on Lucas and JudicialConservatsm, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 301 (1993) (claiming that
Supreme Court enforcement of restrictions on regulatory takings undermines federalism);
Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism:The Takings Clause andLocalLandUse
Decisions,59 Md L Rev 464 (2000) (same); StewartE. Sterk, TheFederalistDimensionof
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,114 Yale L J 203 (2004) (same). For a brief response
to Hills's argument, see Ilya Somin, FederalismandJudicialEnforcementofConstitutional PropertyRights, Volokh Conspiracy (June 20, 2010), online at http://volokh.com
/2010/06/20/federalism-and-judicial-enforcement-of-constitutional-property-rights (visited
Sept 9, 2011).
6 Ellickson, 44 Tulsa L Rev at 762-63 (cited in note 5).
7 See Hills, 74 Geo Wash LRev 888 (cited in note 5); Kelo, 545 US at 482; San Remo,
545 US at 347 (noting that "state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal
courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions relatedto zoning
and land-use regulations").
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than federal courts in assessing conditions within their jurisdictions, federal judicial protection of property rights ultimately
empowers not judges but property owners. It is the latter who
will actually get to decide the uses of the land in question in cases where federal courts prevent state or local governments from
condemning their property or restricting its use. As a general
rule, property owners are likely to have greater knowledge of
their land than local government officials do, even if the latter
are more knowledgeable than federal judges. This is particularly
likely in cases where the local or state government in question
rules over millions of people with numerous diverse properties
and therefore necessarily has only very limited information
about variations in conditions within its domain. Moreover, the
local expertise rationale for judicial deference to the states on
property rights issues would, if adopted by courts, also justify
underenforcement of numerous other constitutional rights.
At the outset, it is useful to state the limited nature of my
analysis in this Article. I do not advance a comprehensive theory
of judicial protection for property rights. Rather, I merely reject
the view that federalism provides a strong reason for restricting
judicial enforcement of constitutional property rights by federal
courts. There are other justifications for strictly limiting judicial
protection of property rights that I do not consider here, such as
claims that this approach is required by adherence to precedent
or by fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution.8 Likewise, I do not consider the full range of arguments in favor of
strong judicial enforcement of property rights, such as those
based on natural law theory or economic efficiency.9 The Article
8 For arguments thatthe original meaning of the Constitution justifies heavy judicial deference on property rights issues, see William Michael Treanor, The OriginalUnderstandingofthe Takings Clause andthe PobticalProcess,95 Colum L Rev 782 (1995);
Jed Rubenfeld, Usings,102 Yale L J 1077 (1993). For contrary views, see Eric R. Claeys,
Pubbc Use Limitations and NaturalProperty Rgbts, 2004 Mich St L Rev 877, 894-905
(2004) (discussing in detail the limited eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conceptions of
public use thatbannedmost private-to-private takings); James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian
of Every Other Right:A ConstitutionalHistory of PropertyRights 42-59 (Oxford 3d ed
2008) (detailing the evidence that protecting property rights was a central purpose of the
Constitution at the time of the founding); James W. Ely, Jr., Can the 'DespoticPower"Be
Tamed? Reconsidering the Pubc Use Limitation on EminentDomain, 17 Prob & Prop
31, 32-36 (2003) (describing how nineteenth-century courts generally upheld "private to
private"takings only in cases where the newprivate owner was a common carriersuch as
a railroad or regulated a public utility).
9 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Takings: PrivateProperty and the Power of
EminentDomain(Harvard 1985); Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Neglect How to Revive
ConstitutionalProtectionforPrivatePropeity(Oxford2008); Ellen Frankel Paul, PropertyRkghts andEminentDomain (New Brunswick 1987).
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does not develop a comprehensive theory of the appropriate level
of judicial protection for property rights.
I also focus on property rights issues arising under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.10 These include "public use"
cases, which examine whether a condemnation of property by the
government serves a purpose that qualifies as a public use, and
regulatory takings cases, where courts determine whether a regulation that restricts the use of property is sufficiently onerous to
qualify as a "taking" that requires "just compensation" under the
Amendment. Kelo is, of course, the best-known recent Supreme
Court public use decision; it reaffirmed the view that almost any
"public purpose" or potential benefit qualifies as a public use.
The Court has also decided a number of important regulatory
takings cases over the last three decades." In this area as well,
the Court has taken a generally deferential approach, imposing
only quite weak restraints on state and local governments,
though it has been less passive than on public use. 12
Notwithstanding its limited focus, the Article does examine
and criticize an important rationale for judicial deference on
property rights issues, one that has been embraced by the Supreme Court and prominent legal scholars. It also resolves a
seeming contradiction in conservative and libertarian constitutional thought. Commentators associated with these two viewpoints tend to argue for both strict limits on federal power and
strong judicial protection of property rights against interference
by local and state governments. This creates an apparent contradiction, one that I briefly considered in my very first article criticizing the Court's decision in Kelo.1 3 Is it inconsistent for me and
others to support both strong limits on federal power on one
hand and robust federal judicial protection of property rights
against local government on the other? 1 4 In this Article, I explain
10 US Const Amend V.

11For some of the more prominent examples, see San Remo, 545 US at 346-47; Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncilv Tahoe RegionalPlanningAgency,535 US 302 (2002);
Dolan v City of Tigard,512 US 374 (1994); Lucas v South Carolina CoastalCouncil,505
US 1003 (1992); Yee vEscondido, 503 US 519 (1992); Nollan v CaliforniaCoastalCommission,483 US 825 (1987).
12 See lya Somin, Taking PropertyRig hts Seriously?The Supreme Court and the
'PoorRelation"ofConstitutionalLaw,George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper
No 8-53 at 3-26 (2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
-1247854 (visited Sept 9, 2011) (surveying the relevant cases).
13 See Ilya Somin, Controllingthe GraspingHand: EconomicDevelopment Takings
After Kelo, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev 183, 221-23 (2007).
14 For my work exploring the benefits of decentralization and competition in government, see, for example, Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, PoliticalIgnorance,and Constitutional
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why the inconsistency is more apparent than real. In reality, judicial protection for property rights enhances decentralization
more than it undermines it.

I. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LilITS OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL
COMPETITION

Some who deploy the federalism argument against judicial
enforcement of property rights argue that such intervention is
unnecessary because "competitive federalism" will constrain
abuses.15 Advocates claim that state and local governments that
abuse the power of eminent domain or engage in excessive regulatory takings will lose business and taxpayers to other jurisdictions, thereby suffering financial losses as a result.16 Robert Ellickson contends that this factor helps account for what he considers to be the relatively strong political reaction to Kelo, under
which various states and localities have enacted strong reform
laws intended to curb economic development takings.17 Ellickson's claim is an extension of standard economic theories arguing
that the combination of decentralization and mobility will constrain subnational government abuses and force them to adopt
efficient economic policies that benefit citizens.18

Desgn, 28 Soc Phil & Pol 202 (2011); John McGinnis and Ilya Somin, Federal&m vs.
States' Rights: A Defense of JudicialReview in a FederalSystem, 99 Nw U L Rev 89
(2004).
15 Ellickson, 44 Tulsa L Rev at 762 (cited in note 5).
16 See id at 762-63. See also Vicki L Been, 'Exit"asa ConstraintonLand Use Exactions: Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine, 91 Colum L Rev 473, 509
(1991). See also Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 Harv L Rev 1273
(2008) (providing evidence showing that the effects of various laws are capitalized into
home prices, which local governments have incentives to keep high).
17 Ellickson, 44 Tulsa L Rev at 762-63 & n 66 (cited in note 5).
18 For examples of some of the better-known works along these lines, see Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocalExpenditures,64 J Polit Econ 416(1956); Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Powerto Tax:AnalyticalFoundationsof a F1scalConstitution 173-86 (Cambridge 1980); Albert Breton, Competitive Governments: An Economic TheoryofPoihticsandPubhcFinance(Cambridge 1996); Thomas R. Dye, Amerian
Federalism:Competition Among Governments (Lexington Books 1990); James M. Buchanan, Federalismas an Ideal PoliticalOrderandan Objective for ConstitutionalReform, 25 Publius 19 (Spring 1995); Wallace E. Oates, An Essayon FiscalFederalism,37 J
Econ Lit 1120, 1134-37 (1999); Wallace E. Oates and Robert Schwab, Economic Competition AmongJurisdictions:EfficiencyEnhancing or Efficiency Distorting?,35 J Pub Econ
333 (1988); Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of PoliticalInstitutions: MarketPreservingFederalismandEconomicDevelopment, 11 J L, Econ, & Org 1 (1995).
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A. The Impact of Immobility
The main difficulty with such competitive federalism arguments is that they fail to take adequate account of the immobility
of property rights in land. Property owners are unlikely to "vote
with their feet" against eminent domain or regulatory exactions
because, if they move out, they cannot take their land with them.
Exit rights are little help in protecting assets that you can't take
with you when you leave.19
This crucial point suggests that competitive federalism is
particularly unlikely to protect property rights in land. In some
instances, limits on state and local governments' ability to tax
mobile assets such as income might actually incentivize them to
target immobile ones such as land, in order to find ways to transfer resources to favored interest groups. 20 In this way, competitive federalism might actually exacerbate rather than alleviate
the exploitation of immobile resources. For example, state and
local governments are limited in their ability to raise income taxes because of tax competition between jurisdictions. Migration
patterns tend to favor low-tax jurisdictions. 2 1 This factor increases state and local government incentives to target immobile resources such as land instead. Other evidence suggests that local
governments generally tend to overexploit immobile capital,
while oversubsidizing mobile resources. 22
1. State and local government incentives to exploit immobile resources.
Even if competitive federalism does not exacerbate state and
local government tendencies to exploit immobile resources, it at
least is unlikely to protect them from state predation. Individuals might choose to leave a given jurisdiction. But they will have
19 See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights underFederalism,55 L & Contemp Probs 147,
154-59 (1992) (explaining limits of exit rights in protecting immobile assets); William
Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, andPolitics282-88 (Harvard 1995) (explaining ways in which government action involving abusive regulatory takings has adverse consequences for landowners given the immobile nature of real property).
2 See, for example, David Wildasin, Labor-MarketIntegration,Investment in Risky
Human Capital,andliscalCompetition, 90 Am Econ Rev 73 (2000).
21 See Elda Pema, Do State TaxesAffect the Mgration of Human Capital?,Working
2
Paper (2009), online at https://www.msu.edu/-pemaelda/E_Pema-Taxes%2and% O
Human%20Capital.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011) (summarizing previous studies and providing evidence that higher-income and better-educated taxpayers are particularly likely to
gravitate to low-tax jurisdictions).
22 See generally Richard Schragger, Mobile Capita, LocalEconomic Regulation, and
the Democratic City,123 Harv L Rev 482 (2009).
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to leave their land behind, still available for the state to take,
regulate, or tax. For this very reason, it is unlikely that individuals who fear threats to their immobile property will choose to
migrate for that purpose in the first place. After all, doing so incurs moving costs, 23 but does not actually accomplish the goal of
protecting the threatened property.
The problem is not simply, as Professor Melvyn R. Durchslag
puts it, that exit rights "cost money" lost as a result of regulatory
impositions. 24 It is that moving fails to accomplish the purpose of
freeing the owner from the very burden it was undertaken to
avoid. If the owner moves without selling the property, he or she
is no better off than before, since the land remains subject to the
regulatory mandate in question. If the owner does sell, the price
he or she gets will be proportionately lower as a result of the
regulation, and the resulting loss will simply take the form of a
lower sale value. Either way, the immobility of property prevents
the owner from using exit rights as a means of escaping a regulatory burden imposed on land. For this reason, targeting immobile
property is unlikely to cost the state by incentivizing the owners
to flee and take their mobile assets and income with them.
Landowners who believe that their land is threatened could
potentially avoid the danger if they sell the land and move before
the threat materializes. For example, if they suspect their land is
likely to be condemned by the local government, they could try to
sell the property before the condemnation actually happens.
However, this strategy is only likely to work if the real estate
market fails to take account of the risk of condemnation and incorporate it into the price of the land. In reality, the threat of
eminent domain tends to drive down land prices in a given area,
a phenomenon known as "condemnation blight."25 The same is
likely to be true for other types of threats to property rights. The
owner will only be able to "escape" the threat if he or she has private information unavailable to the market or if she finds an obtuse or highly risk-acceptant buyer. As Professor Ellickson recognizes, "if the abuse [of property rights] were widely known,
exiting in this fashion would not enable the landowner to avoid

23 For a brief discussion of the relevance ofmoving costs to foot voting, see Somin, 28
Soc Phil & Pol at 214-15 (cited in note 14).
24 Durchslag, 59 Md L Rev at 511 (cited in note 5).
25 For the classic analysis, see Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Bhght: JustHow Just
Is Just Compensation , 48 Notre Dame L Rev 765 (1973).
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financial loss because most, if not all, of the cost of the abuse
would be negatively capitalized in the sale price." 26
Obviously, regulatory and tax burdens that affect mobile assets also sometimes impact immobile ones as well. For example,
high state income taxes or a weak economy caused by poor regulatory policies might reduce land values. However, there is an
important distinction between a regulatory burden that primarily affects a mobile asset and one whose impact falls mostly on an
immobile one. In the former case, affected individuals still have a
significant incentive to move to avoid the burden, since doing so
can relieve them of most of it, even if not all.
Consider, for example, a flawed economic policy 80 percent of
whose costs come in the form of reduced incomes and 20 percent
in the form of reduced home values. Exit rights can still be used
to avoid 80 percent of the associated harm. In this scenario,
many of the losers from the policy will have an incentive to exit
from the jurisdiction in order to avoid it.
By contrast, the costs of eminent domain and regulatory takings mostly fall on immobile assets, and exit therefore cannot be
used to avoid most of them. The key point is not so much whether a policy targets immobile assets in a formal legal sense, but
whether its effects can be escaped by moving. With most eminent
domain and regulatory takings policies, the answer is largely
no.
Despite recognizing that "[t]he immobility of land reduces
political pressures on states and cities to treat landowners fairly,"2 7 Ellickson nonetheless claims that competitive pressures
will reduce such abuses because their presence is likely to drive
down land prices. This in turn gives voters incentives to mobilize
against them, and local governments reason to cut back on abuse
in order to maintain their tax base. 28 As a class, homeowners
wield great influence over local governments, and keeping up the
value of their property is usually one of their main objectives. 29
Ellickson's point would be an important constraint on local
government abuse of property rights if all or most property were
equally threatened by such abuses, thereby driving down prices
across the board. In fact, however, the use of eminent domain for
26 Ellickson, 44 Tulsa L Rev at 763 n 66 (cited in note 5).
27 Id.

2 Id.
2 See generally William Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis:How Home Values
Influence LocalGovernmen t, Taxation,School Finance, andLand-Use Pobcies (Harvard
2001).
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transfer to private parties generally targets the poor and politically weak.30 Wealthier and more politically influential groups
are rarely targeted for the good reason that they can impose severe political costs on officials who try to take their property.
Politically vulnerable groups do indeed suffer declines in the
value of their property in jurisdictions that make extensive use of
eminent domain and other restrictions on property rights. But
there is likely to be little or no impact on the value of other land
in the area. For this reason, many jurisdictions can abuse property rights extensively without risking more than a modest erosion of their property tax base. The fact that politically vulnerable groups are the ones targeted also makes it unlikely that they
can effectively use their "voice" in the political process to make
up for the ineffectiveness of exit rights.31
The perverse incentives of local governments are often exacerbated by "time horizon" problems. Even if ill-advised takings
and other restrictions on property rights do erode the tax base or
otherwise weaken the local economy, the effects usually do not
become evident for several years, by which time the political
leaders who adopted these policies might well be out of office and
public attention will, in any event, have moved on to other matters. 32 By contrast, transferring land to politically favored interests at the expense of the poor or politically weak creates immediate political benefits for politicians.
The relatively short time horizons facing politicians further
reduce the impact of competitive federalism in restraining abuses of property rights. Given the immobility of land, any negative
competitive effects from such abuses are likely to be modest in
size and emerge only slowly. By the time they do, enough time
may have passed that the political leaders responsible will escape any political retaliation.
In the case of eminent domain, the effects of immobility are
partly offset by the fact that the government must pay "fair market value" compensation for the property it condemns. However,
compensation payments do not account for the "subjective value"
many owners attach to their property above and beyond its mar30 See Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 195-97, 267-71 (cited in note 13); Dick M. Carpenter andJohn K. Ross, TestingO'Connorand Thomas: Does the Use OfEminent Domain TargetPoor andMinority Communities?, 46 Urban Stud 2447 (2009).
31 See also the discussion in Part II.B, below, explaining how political ignorance
limits the effectivenes of voice in constraining abuse of property rights by local governments. For the classic formulation of voice andexit as alternative responses to bad policy,
see Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, andLoyalty(Harvard1971).
32 See Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 202-03 (cited in note 13).
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ket price, and often do not even fully compensate for market value. 33
2.

Why mobile assets are different.

The importance of immobility does suggest that state and local governments should be less likely to threaten the rights of
owners of mobile assets. For example, the California Supreme
Court has ruled that local governments can use eminent domain
to condemn sports teams in order to prevent them from moving,
thereby authorizing the City of Oakland to use eminent domain
against the Oakland Raiders in order to prevent their planned
move to Los Angeles. 34 Such condemnations would also probably
be legal in the many other states that define "public use" very
broadly, and under federal public use standards.35 Yet condemnations of sports teams and other mobile assets are extremely
rare, probably because the owners of such assets can move them
out of state before any condemnation is completed. 36 In 1985, an
effort by the City of Baltimore to condemn the NFL's Baltimore
Colts franchise in order to keep it from moving to Indianapolis
failed because the Colts were able to depart before the city paid

33 See discussion of compensation in Part II.A, below, and works cited there.

3 City ofOaklandvOaklandRaiders,646 P2d 835 (Cal 1982). A California appellate
court later ruled that this eminent domain action was barredby the Commerce Clause of
the federal Constitution because of the resulting burden on interstate commerce. City of
Oakland v OaklandRaiders, 174 Cal App 3d 414 (Cal App 1st Dist 1985). However, the
basis for the ruling-that the City's plan would create an injunction preventing the team
from moving forever and that it would affect an entire nationwide league rather than just
the Raiders-would not extend to most other types of mobile property. Id at 421.
35 See, for example, Kelo, 545 US at 469-77 (concluding that any "public purpose"
qualifies as a public use); HawaiiHousing Authority vMdkiff, 467 US 229, 241 (1984)
(holding that a public use is anything "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose"). For discussions of broad definitions of "public use" at the state level, see, for example, Ilya Somin, The Limits ofBacklash: Assessing the PoliticalResponse to Kelo, 93
Minn L Rev 2100, 2120-37 (2009) (explaining how many states retain extremely broad
public use standards even after the Kelo backlash); Thomas Merrill and David A. Dana,
Property:Takings 196 (Foundation 2002) (noting that most state courts have "settled on a
broader understanding [of public use] that requires only that the taking yield some public
benefit or advantage"). Overthe last twenty years, many state supreme courts have taken
a more restrictive approach to public use. See Ilya Somin, The JudicialReactionto Kelo, 4
Albany Gov L Rev 1 (2011). However, the broad view is still widely accepted.
36 The California court that ultimately invalidated the attempted condemnation of
the Oakland Raiders noted that "eminent domain cases have traditionally concerned real
property, rarely implicating commerce clause considerations which deal primarily with

products in the flow of interstate commerce. Whether the commerce clause precludes
takingby eminent domain of intangible property, however, is a novel question posed, it
seems, for the firsttime in this case." City ofOakandvOaklandRaiders,174 Cal App 3d
at 419.
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compensation for the taking.37 The federal district court agreed
that "it is now beyond dispute that intangible property is properly the subject of condemnation proceedings," but refused to uphold the condemnation because the Colts were able to leave the
jurisdiction before compensation was paid. 38
B. Some Relevant Empirical Evidence
Historical evidence on the use of eminent domain undercuts
claims that it can be successfully constrained by competitive federalism. If the theory were true, the takings that inflict great
harm on property owners for little or no social gain should be
extremely rare, if not nonexistent. In reality, large-scale abuse of
eminent domain authority by state and local governments is far
from uncommon in American history.
Between World War II and the present, several million
Americans, most of them poor or minorities, were forcibly displaced by blight, "urban renewal," and economic development
takings. 39 In most cases, those forced to move suffered substantially greater harm than they were ever compensated for.40 Over
time, most states have expanded the legal definition of "blight" to
the point where almost any area can be declared "blighted" and
condemned, making it easier to transfer property coveted by influential interest groups. 41 Under these ultra-broad definitions,
37 Mayor& City CouncilofBaltimorevBaltimore FootballClub, Inc, 624 F Supp 278,
283 (D Md 1985).
38 Id at 282-84.
39 Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 268-69 (cited in note 13).
40 For various accounts describing these losses see, for example, Herbert J.Gans, The
Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life ofItalian-Americans362-84 (Free 2d ed
1982) (documenting loss of community and economic harms caused by condemnations);
Scott Greer, UrbanRenewalandAmericanCities: The DilemmaofDemocraticIntervention 35-64 (Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (describing harm caused by urban renewal condemnations); Martin Anderson, The FederalBulldozer: A CriticalAnalysis of UrbanRenewal
1949-196252-72 (MIT 1964) (describing the enormous social and economic costs of urban
development takings); Jane Jacobs, The Death andLife ofGreatAmerican Cities 5, 27090, 311-14 (Random House 1961) (same); Wendell E. Pritchett, The 'Pblic Menace"of
Bhgh t: UrbanRenewaland the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale L & Pol Rev 1
(2003) (describing use of blight condemnations to force out poor minority populations);
Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with
Resident Control,27 U Mich J L Ref 689, 740-41 (1994) (describing extensive uncompensatedlosses sufferedby victims of urban renewal condemnations); Chester W. Hartman,
Relocation:Blusory PromisesandNo Relief, 57 Va L Rev 745 (1971) (same).
41 See lya Somin, BhghtSweetBhght, Legal Times 42 (Aug 14,2006); Colin Gordon,
Bhghtingthe Way: UrbanRenewal, EconomicDevelopment, andthe Elusive Definitionof
Bhgh4 31 Fordham Urban LJ 305,307 (2004). Broad definitions of blight have persisted
in many states even in the aftermath of post-Kelo reform. See Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at
2120-28 (cited in note 35).
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courts have ruled that even such areas as downtown Las Vegas
and Times Square in New York can be declared "blighted" and
condemned.42 In two recent decisions, the New York Court of Appeals has upheld major blight condemnations based on an extremely broad definitions of "blight" under which virtually any
area qualifies.43 Both decisions also chose to overlook flagrant
bias on the part of condemning authorities in favor of powerful
interest groups to which the condemned property was transferred.44
In many of these cases, the federal government helped finance or otherwise promote the relevant takings. 45 But state and
local governments generally took the leading role and paid most
of the costs.4 6
Pure "economic development" takings have resulted in abuses similar to those engendered by "blight" condemnations. In the
famous 1981 Poletown case, over 4000 Detroiters were expelled
from their homes and numerous businesses and schools were
destroyed so that land could be transferred to General Motors to
build a new factory that turned out to be far less productive than
originally promised. 47 In Poletown and many other such cases,
the condemnations actually ended up destroying far more economic value than was ever created by the new uses of the condemned land.48
42 See CityofLas VegasDowntown Redevelopment Agency vPappas,76 P3d 1, 1215 (Nev 2003) (holding that downtown Las Vegas is blighted); Inre W41stStRealty v
New York State UrbanDevelopment Corp,744 NYS 2d 121, 125-26 (NY App Div 2002)
(holding that Times Square is blighted).
43 See Matter of Goldstein vNew York State UrbanDevelopment Corp,921 NE 2d
164, 172-73 (NY 2009) (defining blight as any area where there is "economic underdevelopment" or "stagnation" and holding that, even under this broad definition of blight, a
blight designation could only be invalidated if "there is no room for reasonable difference
of opinion as to whether an area is blighted"); Matter ofKaur vNew York State Urban
Development Corp, 933 NE 2d 721 (NY 2010) (adopting the Goldstein definition of
"blight"). For a detailed discussion of these two cases andthe abuses involved, see Somin,
4 Albany Gov L Rev at 15-21 (cited in note 35); and lya Somin, Let There Be Bhght:
Bhht Condemnationsin New York after Goldstein andKaur, 38 Fordham Urban LJ
1193 (2011) (symposium on eminent domain in New York).
4 For a detailed discussion of this aspect of the case, see Somin, Let There Be Bhght
(cited in note 43).
45 See works cited in note 35.
46 Id.
47 Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit,304 NW2d 455 (Mich 1981),
overruled by County of Wayne v Hatbcock, 684 NW2d 765 (Mich 2004). For a detailed
analysis of Poletown and Hathcock, see Ilya Somin, OvercomingPoletown: County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, EconomicDevelopmentTakings, andthe Phture of Public Use, 2004
Mich St L Rev 1005 (symposium on Countyof Wayne vHathcock).
48 See Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 190-200 (cited in note 13). For the relevant
evidence on the Poletowntakings, see Somin, OverwmingPoletown, 2004 Mich St L Rev
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This extensive record of abuse undercuts claims that competitive federalism is sufficient to provide strong protection for
property rights in land and other immobile assets. It is, of course,
possible that the situation would have been even worse without
federalism. It is difficult to say what the state of property rights
protection in the United States would have been under a less
federal or purely unitary political system. At the very least, however, it is clear that competitive federalism has not been enough
to prevent massive and persistent abuses of property rights by
state and local governments.
Other relevant evidence includes the tendency of some unpopular minority groups to avoid investing in land in order to
make it easier for them to flee unfriendly jurisdictions. The tendency of Diaspora Jews to invest in "human capital" instead of
land is a classic example."9 Jews were forced to take such precautions despite the fact that there was widespread freedom of
movement throughout Europe until the spread of passport systems in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made
migration more difficult.50 The existence of freedom of movement
and dozens of competing independent states in early modern Europe was not sufficient to make it safe for an oppressed minority
to invest heavily in immobile property.5 1
To be sure, when members of an unpopular group choose not
to acquire immobile assets, they can avoid victimization by local
governments who target such assets. But this benefit comes at
the cost of losing the advantages of owning land. Thus, the tendency of government to overexploit immobile assets still imposes
severe costs on these groups, albeit indirectly.
Overall, both economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that competitive federalism is unlikely to provide more than
a very modest level of protection for property rights in land and
at 1011-21 (cited in note 47).
4 See Reuven Brenner and Nicholas M. Kiefer, The Economics of the Diaspora:DiscriminationandOccupationalStructure,29 Econ Dev & Cultural Change 517 (1981). For
criticism of this view, see Eliezer Ayal and Barry Chiswick, The Economics ofthe DiasporaRevisited,31 Econ Dev & Cultural Change 861 (1983). But see Reuven Brenner, The
Economics of the DiasporaRevisited:A Reply,31 E con Dev & Cultural Change 877 (1983)
(response to the critics). See also StevenMenashi, Jews andMoney, Commentary 49, 51
(Feb 2010) ("Always under the threat of expropriation or expulsion, it made little sense
for Jews to acquire landor other immovable goods; one could more easily relocate wealth
gained from trade or finance.").
5 See John Torpey, The Invention ofthe Passport:Surveflance, Citizenshio, and the
State 57-121 (Cambridge 2000).
51Germany alone contained over 300 independent states until the Congress of Vie nnareducedtheirnumberto "only"thirty-nine. See generally Adam Zamoyski, The Rites
ofPeace: The FallofNapoleon and the Congress of Vienna (Harper Collins 2007).
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other immobile assets. It seems to be much more effective in the
case of mobile personal and intangible property. But that still
leaves state and local governments free to target land. So long as
property in land continues to be immobile and subject to the jurisdiction of whatever state and local governments govern the
area where it is located, 52 this danger is likely to persist. Strong
protection for the latter probably requires federal intervention.
II. KNOWLEDGE, EXPERTISE, AND DIVERSE LOCAL CONDITIONS
The most often cited federalism-based critique of federal judicial protection of property rights is the idea that state authorities have superior knowledge and expertise in weighing competing uses of land. Both the Supreme Court and scholars such as
Roderick Hills and Thomas Merrill and have emphasized the
superior "institutional competence" of state governments in addressing property rights issues. 53
It is indeed true that federal judges "mostly innocent of any
real knowledge of real estate" have less knowledge of property
issues than state and local officials. 54 But this argument for abjuring federal judicial protection for property rights has crucial
weaknesses. It ignores the fact that protection for property rights
empowers property owners, not judges, to make decisions concerning the use of their land. Owners are likely to be more
knowledgeable than government officials about their property,
and often have better incentives to find the most efficient use for
their land. It also ignores the extent to which the supposed expertise of local officials might serve the agendas of organized interest groups rather than promote efficient use of land.

52 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have proposed allowing landowners to
choose to have their property governed by the laws of other jurisdictions with respect to
various matters. See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, OfPropertyandFederalism, 115 Yale L J 72, 101-13 (2005). Bell and Parchomovsky's proposal is unlikely to be
enacted in the near future. In any event, it explicitly excludes some areas of law, and
probably would not allow property owners to opt out of a local jurisdiction's power of
eminent domain or ability to impose regulatory takings. Id at 109-13.
53 See Hills, 74 Geo Wash LRev 888 (cited in note 5) (emphasizing superior "institutional competence" of state governments); San Remo, 545 US at 347 (noting that "state
courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving the complex
factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations"). See
also Merrill Testimony, 109th Cong, 1st Sess at 16 (cited in note 5) (making similar
points, and emphasizing that "property rights have different circumstances around the
country. I think that this is an area where State variation and experimentation ought to
be allowed to flourish.").
54 Hills, 74 Geo Wash L Rev 888 (cited in note 5).
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The problem of externalities from property owners' use of
their land does not undermine the general conclusion that owners have greater local knowledge and expertise than governments do. Although externalities are a genuine problem, they
can be created by government policy just as easily as alleviated
by it. Moreover, property owners have numerous private sector
tools for handling externalities on their own without government
assistance. Even if local governments need some leeway to address externalities created by property owners, that does not justify an across-the-board policy of judicial deference on property
rights issues.
Finally, the argument from expertise and interstate diversity would, if applied consistently, justify eliminating judicial protection of a wide range of constitutional rights, not just property
rights. For example, the rights protected by the First and Fourth
Amendments also involve factors that vary greatly from state to
state and questions on which federal judges are likely to be less
knowledgeable than state and local officials.
A.

Property Rights and Local Knowledge

When federal judicial rulings protect property rights, they
necessarily do so through the agency of federal judges, most of
whom lack expertise in property law and local land use issues.
But it is not the judges who are thereby empowered to determine
the uses of the property in question. Rather, it is the private
owners of the land. The latter may well have greater knowledge
about the property and its possible uses than state officials do.
If courts invalidate a condemnation because it is not for a
public use,55 the result is that the owners can determine the use
5 Even after Kelo, federal courts can still invalidate takings if the official rationale
for the condemnation is a pretext "for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a
particular private party." Kelo, 545 US at 477. See also id at 478 (noting that government
is not "allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its
actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit"). For a detailed discussion of the development of pretextual takings jurisprudence, see Somin, 4 Albany Gov L Rev at 24-37
(cited in note 35). For examples of recent cases where federal courts have invalidated
takings as pretextual, see, for example, Daniels v Area Plan Commission, 306 F3d 445,
465-66 (7th Cir 2002) (invalidating a taking as pretextual because of lack of a clear plan);
Armendariz vPenman, 75 F3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir 1996) (en banc) (invalidating a taking
because the official rationale ofblight alleviation was a mere pretext for "a scheme ... to
deprive the plaintiffs of their property. . .so a shopping-center developer could buy [it] at
a lower price"); Aaron v TargetCorp,269 F Supp 2d 1162, 1174-76 (ED Mo 2003), revd on
other grounds, 357 F3d 768 (8th Cir 2004) (holding that a property owner was likely to
prevail on a claim that a taking ostensibly to alleviate blight was actually intended to
serve the interests of the Target Corporation); CottonwoodChristian Center v Cypress
Redevelopment Agency, 218 F Supp 2d 1203, 1229 (CD Cal 2002) ("Courts must look
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of that property for themselves. They can choose to continue
their present use of the land, change to a different use, or sell the
property to someone else. In making this decision, they have every incentive to exploit their knowledge of the land and its attributes. When courts force government to pay compensation for
"regulatory takings," the result is less straightforward, since the
government still ends up determining or at least restricting the
use of the land in question. Nonetheless, the requirement of
compensation might deter government from undertaking some
inefficient regulations at the margin, and might also force it to
take greater account of the costs inflicted by regulations.56
As F.A. Hayek famously described, participants in the market often have "local knowledge" that is unavailable to government officials and planners.57 Hayek emphasized the relevance of
"the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and
place" with respect to which "practically every individual has
some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which
use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to
him or are made with his active cooperation."58 The protection of
property rights often facilitates effective use of precisely this
kind of local knowledge.
Two types of local knowledge are especially important in
considering the effects of judicial intervention to protect property
rights: knowledge of the details of a particular lot and its uses,
and knowledge of the "subjective value" of the property in question.

beyond the government's purported public use to determine whether that is the genuine
reason or if it is merely pretext."); 99CentsOnlyStorevLancasterRedevelopmentAgency, 237 F Supp 2d 1123, 1125-32 (CD Cal 2001) (invalidating taking as pretextual). Compare MIC FinancingLtdPartnershiov City of San Rafael,2006 WL 3507937, * 14 (ND
Cal 2006) (ruling that Kelorequires a "careful and extensive inquiry"into the question of
whether a private-to-private taking was actually adopted for the purpose of benefiting a
private party).
5 See, for example, Jonathan Adler, Money orNothing:The Adverse Environmental
Consequences of UncompensatedRegulatoryTakings, 49 BC L Rev 301 (2008) (arguing
that compensation requirements deter inefficient regulation and improve environmental
policy). But see Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 214-18 (cited in note 13) (discussing limitations of compensation requirements); Daryl Levinson, Making Governments Pay:Mar-

kets, Politics,andthe Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U Chi L Rev 345, 345 (2000)
(arguing that"[g]overnment actors respondto political incentives, not financial ones-to
votes, not dollars. We cannot assume that government will internalize social costs just
because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay".
57 F.A. Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (1945).
5 Id at 521.
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It is a standard truism of property and contract law that
every tract of real property is unique.59 For this reason, monetary
damages are usually considered inadequate in cases where a contract requires the delivery of real property.60 Because each piece
of property often has unique or at least unusual characteristics,
it is extremely difficult or impossible for any government planning agency to become familiar with all the different tracts within its jurisdiction. This is particularly likely in large jurisdictions
such as New York City, where planners preside over a population
of millions of people with many thousands of different property
tracts. New York City, California, and other large jurisdictions
have some of the most permissive eminent domain laws in the
country, and make extensive use of condemnation.61 In massive
jurisdictions like these, government planners cannot possibly
achieve more than minimal familiarity with most of the land in
their area. 62
By contrast, property owners are far more likely to be
knowledgeable about their land. They also have strong incentives
to seek out additional information in order to avoid missing opportunities to increase the value of their land by making improvements or switching it to more profitable uses.
59 See, for example, Rieveman vBurlingtonNorthernRailroadCompany,618 F Supp
592, 596 (SDNY 1985) (noting that "it is a well-settled principle of equity jurisprudence
that every tract of landis considered unique"); Muehlman vKeilman, 272NE 2d 591, 595
(Ind 1971) ("equity regards every tract of land as unique"); Kay v Vatterott,657 SW 2d
80, 82 (Mo App Ct 1983) ("[elvery tract of land is recognized as having a unique value");
Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 360 at Comment (a) ("A specific tract is unique and
impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money. Specific performance is
available to enforce a contract the purpose of which is the transfer of any recognized
interest in land to the purchaser, eventhough it is less than a fee simple."); Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, § 39 at Comment (e) ("Plainly, a promised
conveyance of real property (or any other unique good)is a performance for whichthere is
no market-based substitute.").
6 Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 360.
61 On New York, see Somin, Albany GovL Rev at 15-21 (cited in note 35) (describing
recent major "blight" takings in New York City); Somin, Let There Be Bhght(cited in
note 43) (criticizing recent highly permissive New York eminent domain decisions); Dick
Carpenter and John K. Ross, Empire State Eminent Domain:Robin Hoodin Reverse
(Institute for Justice 2010), online at http://www.ij.org/about/3045 (visited Sept 9, 2011)
(describing extensive use of eminent domain in New York, especially against poor and
minority neighborhoods). On California, see, for example, Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 213132 (cited in note 35) (noting weakness of post-Kelo reform laws in California); Steven
Malanga, Can California Curb Land Grabs?, LA Times B13 (Jan 24,2006) (describing
extensive use of eminent domain in the state).
62 See generally Randal OToole, The Best-Laid lans:How Government Planning
Harms Your Qualty of Life, Your Pocketbook, and Your Future(Cato Institute 2007)
(providing extensive evidence of the knowledge limitations of government land use planners).
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In addition to its market value, property often has a "subjective value" to its owners above and beyond the market price. 63
For example, homeowners often feel a sentimental attachment to
their houses, or value the personal, family, and business ties
they have in a given neighborhood.64 Small business owners also
sometimes invest subjective value in their commercial property,
especially if staying in a particular location is important to the
business's continued viability.6 5 Property occupied by houses of
worship, private schools, and various charitable enterprises
might also have unusually high subjective value.66
In theory, government planners could take account of subjective value simply by asking owners how much value they attach
to their land above and beyond the market price, and compensating them accordingly. In reality, however, owners will have
strong incentives to misrepresent that value if compensation
payments depend on it. So government officials have no practical
6 The problem of subjective value isrecognizedby a wide range of scholars. See, for
example, Richard A. Posner, EconomicAnalysis OfLaw§ 19.1 at 531 (Aspen 6th ed 2003)
("Many people place a value on their homes that exceeds its market price."); Janice
Nadler and Shari Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology oflropertyRghts:
ProposedUse, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud 713
(2008); Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 215-16 (cited in note 13); Daniel B. Kelly, The
'Pubbc Use" Requirementin EminentDomain Law: A RationaleBased on Secret PurchasesandPrivateInfluence, 92 Cornell LRev 1,25-26 (2006); Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky, A TheoryofProperty90CornellLRev 531,569 (2005) ("[E]ven where the
object has close substitutes, the development of habit and familiarity, or sentimental
connection, may create rational idiosyncratic value."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics
ofPublic Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 82-85(1986) (showing how the use of eminent domain
systematically imposes "uncompensated subjective losses"because most property owners
value their holdings at more than their market value).
6 See, for example, D. Benjamin Barros, Home asa Lega/Concept,46 Santa Clara L
Rev 255,259-85 (2006) (discussing evidence on the subjective value of homes); Margaret
34 Stan L Rev 957 (1982) (arguing that property
Jane Radin, PropertyandPersonhood,
rights in homes deserve special protection from the law because of various subjective and
personal factors that influence valuation). But see Stephanie M. Stern, ResidentialProtectionism and the LegalAythology of the Home, 107 Mich L Rev 1093 (2009) (arguing
that both previous scholars and legal rules greatly overestimate the subjective value of
homes). However, Sternacknowledges that some subsets of homes do have high subjective value, especially those in "tight-knit communities" and those of the elderly. Id at
1133, 1138-39.
65 See, for example, BernardJ. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc: How
America Rebuilds Cities 34-35 (MIT 1989) (describing the impact of condemnation on
small businesses); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The NeglectedPolticalEconomy ofEminent
Domain, 105 Mich L Rev 101, 106, 124-26 (2006) (describing how businesses often suffer
uncompensated subjective value harms from condemnation).
66 Churches and other houses of worship are an example of atype of high-subjectivevalue property that is often threatened by eminent domain. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of Petitioners, Kelo v City of New London, Civil Action No 04-108, *-11 & n 20 (US filed Dec 3, 2004). But see id at * 12-16
(describing some of the subjective value benefits created by churches).
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way of assessing it accurately. 67 Current compensation payments
often fail to compensate owners even for the market value of
their land, much less the subjective value.68 These problems of
estimating subjective value and inadequate compensation even
for market value undercut the possibility that local governments
can use eminent domain to foster efficient use of land by using
compensation payments as proxies for the value of current land
uses. In making land use decisions for themselves, by contrast,
owners have strong incentives to accurately weigh the subjective
value of their current use of the land against potential alternatives, including that of selling it to developers.
My argument extends recent work by several prominent federalism scholars who advocate the extension of "federalism all
the way down," empowering local governments in addition to the
state governments that are the focus of conventional constitutional federalism theories.69 Local governments, they contend,
can more effectively represent groups that lack political power at
the state level, and also often have specialized local knowledge
and expertise.70 The ultimate extension of political decentralization "all the way down" would transfer power not to local governments, but to individual citizens and civil society organizations, including property owners. Especially with respect to immobile assets that are not well protected by interjurisdictional
competition,71 empowering individual property owners might
lead to more effective exploitation of local knowledge and greater
protection for vulnerable minority groups than deferring to either state or local governments.
The Impact of Political Ignorance

B.

Decades of public opinion research show that most voters
have little or no knowledge of politics and public policy.72 In the
See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 25-26 (cited in note 63).
See Yun-chien Chang, An EmpiricalStudy of Compensation Paidin Eminent Domain Settlements: New York City 1990-2002, 39 J Legal Stud 201 (2010).
69 See, for example, Heather K. Gerken, Foreword:Federalism All the Way Down,
124 Harv L Rev 6 (2010); Richard C. Schragger, Citiesas ConstitutionalActors:The Case
of Same-Sex Marriage,21 J L & Pol 147 (2005).
70 See, for example, Gerken, 124 Harv L Rev 6 (cited in note 69).
71 See Part l.A.
72 See Scott L. Althaus, Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics (Cambridge
2003); Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What AmericansKnowaboutPoEtics
and WhyltMatters69-89(Yale 1996); lya Somin, PoliticalIgnoranceand the CountermajoritarianDifficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional
Theory, 89 Iowa L Rev 1287, 1304-06 (2004) (summarizing evidence of extensive voter
67
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immediate aftermath of the recent 2010 election, only 46 percent
of Americans realized that the election had resulted in Republican control of the House and Democratic control of the Senate,
and only 38 percent could identify John Boehner as the newly
selected Speaker of the House."3 Surveys taken in 2009 revealed
that only 24 percent could identify the Obama administration's
widely debated "cap and trade" proposal as an "environmental"
issue, and a large majority admitted that they did not understand the president's health care bill that was eventually passed
in March 2010.74 Polls conducted around the time of the 2004
election showed that 70 percent of Americans did not know that
Congress had recently enacted a massive prescription drug bill,
and 58 percent admitted that they knew little or nothing about
the controversial USA Patriot Act.7 5
1. Rational ignorance and rational irrationality.
Such political ignorance is actually rational behavior because there is so little chance that an increase in any one voter's
knowledge would have any impact on electoral outcomes. No
matter how knowledgeable a voter becomes, the chance that his
or her better-informed vote will actually swing an election is infinitesimally small. There is, therefore, very little incentive for
most citizens to acquire information about politics and public
policy, at least so long as their only reason to do so is to become
better-informed voters.76
Voters also have poor incentives to rationally evaluate the
limited political information they do possess. Since there is little
reason to acquire information in order to become a "better" voter,
most of those who do pay substantial attention to politics do it for
other reasons, such as entertainment value, or validating their
preexisting beliefs. This leads to what economist Bryan Caplan
ignorance). For an account of the data on voter ignorance, see generally Ilya Somin, Democracy andPoEticalIgnorance (manuscript available from the author).
73 Public Knows BasicFacts aboutPolitics,Economics, but Struggles with Specifics
(Pew Research Centerfor the People and the Press Nov 18, 2010), online athttp://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/677.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2011).
74 See generally Somin, DemocracyandPohticalIgnorance (cited in note 72).
75 Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn't Blss: How PoiticalIgnorance ThreatensDemocracy, Policy Analysis No 525 at Table 1 (Cato Institute Sept 22, 2004), online at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa525.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2011).
76 For a more detailed discussion of the theory of rational ignorance, see Ilya Somin,
Knowledge about Ignorance:New Directionsin the Study of Politicallnformation, 18
Critical Rev 255 (2006). See generally Somin, DemocmcyandPohicallgnorance(cited in
note 72). The theory of rational political ignorance was first developed in Anthony Downs,
An Economic Theory ofDemocracy238-59 (Harper & Row 1957).
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has called "rational irrationality"-a tendency to assess political
information in a highly biased way that often leads to irrational
and badly flawed conclusions.77
Just as sports fans evaluate new information about their favorite team and its rivals in a highly biased way, "political fans"
tend to be similarly biased in favor of their preferred party and
ideology.78 This is individually rational behavior for the same
reason that it is also rational for most citizens to forego acquiring
much political information in the first place. Since there is little
or no payoff to getting at the truth of political issues, biased "political fans" can enjoy following politics without suffering negative consequences for their errors. But this individually rational
behavior can lead to dangerous collective results, as ignorance
and irrationality influence electoral outcomes and policy decisions.
2. Implications for property rights and land use policy.
Widespread rational political ignorance and irrationality is
relevant to the debate over federal judicial enforcement of property rights in two ways: it reduces the extent to which local and
state property rights policies are determined by genuine
knowledge and expertise, and it makes it less likely that abuses
will be corrected through the political process.
a) Reducing the quality of government decision-making.

As compared with most other policies, economic development and
"blight" condemnations of the sort at issue in many public use
cases are unusually difficult for rationally ignorant voters to assess. Their full effects are not evident until years after the fact,
and even then it is difficult or impossible for nonexperts to determine whether the development project made possible by the
use of eminent domain led to greater economic growth than
would have occurred if the previous owners of the land had been
able to determine its use themselves.79 Takings that transfer
property to private parties for the purpose of economic develop77 See generally Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies
Choose BadPo cies(Princeton2007); Bryan Caplan, Rationallgnoranceversus Rational
Irrationality,54 Kyklos 3 (2001).
78 For this comparison and data supporting it, see Ilya Somin, 18 Critical Rev at 26062 (cited in note 76). See also Somin, Democracy andPoEticalIgnorancech 4 (cited in
note 72).
79 For greater detail on these points, see Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 201-03 (cited
in note 13).
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ment or alleviating blight are more difficult for voters to monitor
than traditional "public use" condemnations for governmentowned facilities and public utilities. The effects of the latter are
generally easier for voters to observe because they are usually
embodied in a physical structure such as a road or bridge whose
impact can be more readily assessed than an intangible objective
such as "economic development."80
To the extent that local land-use policy is influenced by voters, it is likely to reflect the impact of political ignorance and irrationality. It therefore is not likely to be guided by any great
expertise or insight into local conditions. On the other hand,
landowners determining the uses of their own property are not
likely to be rationally ignorant, since their decisions on how to
use their land will usually be decisive and have a major impact
on their welfare. They also have strong incentives to make rational use of any relevant information they may acquire. 81
The influence of voter ignorance on land use policy can potentially be reduced by allocating more power to governmentappointed experts insulated from the political process. Such experts may be more knowledgeable than voters. But, absent democratic accountability, it is not clear why they would use their
expertise to promote the welfare of the community as a whole as
opposed to their own goals or those of powerful interest group
lobbies. Unaccountable bureaucracies tend to be vulnerable to
"political capture" by rent-seeking interest groups. 82 At the very
least, unaccountable officials have much weaker incentives to
make efficient use of land than do private owners, who directly
benefit from any increases in the value of their property and bear
the full cost of poor land use decisions.
Moreover, even if the experts are more knowledgeable than
voters, they are still likely to be less knowledgeable than individual property owners deciding the uses of their own land. For
example, they are unlikely to have detailed knowledge of the
characteristics of all the different tracts in a large jurisdiction,
nor do they have the information needed to assess the subjective
value of competing land uses. 3
Id.
See Somin, 28 Soc Phil & Pol at 221-23 (cited in note 14) (describing advantages of
private sector decision-making with respect to rational ignorance and rational irrationality).
82 For a review of the relevant literature on capture and rent-seeking, see Dennis C.
Mueller, Pubhc Choice 1I, 347-53 (Cambridge 2003).
83 See discussion in Part II.A.
8o
81
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Finally, knowledgeable but politically insulated government
experts are still vulnerable to rational irrationality. By virtue of
their very insulation, they suffer little or no personal cost from
making poor policy decisions. As a result, they, like "political
fans" in the general population, might assess information in a
highly biased way, indulging their preexisting prejudices and
ideological preferences rather than seeking truth. Research on
public policy experts suggests that many do a poor job of predicting policy outcomes and other relevant events because of such
biases. 84 For these reasons, transferring power to experts is unlikely to "solve" the problem of voter ignorance.
b) Reducing the ability of the politicalprocess to monitor abuses. In addition to reducing the quality of government
decision making, widespread political ignorance also undermines
the ability of the political process to prevent abuses of property
rights. 85 Voters cannot punish politicians for abusive policies at
the ballot box if the voters do not know what the officials are doing or do not understand the policies' negative effects.
The political reaction to Kelo is a dramatic example of the
impact of political ignorance. Over 80 percent of the public opposed the Court's decision and "economic development" takings,
and the result was denounced by politicians and activists across
the political spectrum.86 Over the next several years, forty-three
states and the federal government all enacted new legislation
that purported to restrict the use of eminent domain-a more
extensive legislative reaction than that against any other decision in Supreme Court history.87 Yet, despite the high profile of
the issue and the strength of public feeling, the majority of the
8 See generally Philip E. Tetlock, Expert PoiticalJudgment: How Good Is It? How
Can We Know?(Princeton 2005) (providing extensive evidence showing that policy experts often predict outcomes poorly in large part because of biases in their judgment).
85 For recent defenses of the view that the political process provides adequate prote ction for property rights, see Christopher Serkin, LocalPropertyLaw:Adjusting the Scale
ofPropertyProtection,107 Colum L Rev 883 (2007) (arguing that local governments have
adequate incentives to provide optimal levels of protection forproperty rights); Daniel H.
Cole, PohticalInstitutions,JudicialRe vie w, andPrivate Property:A ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis,15 Sup Ct Econ Rev 141(2007) (advancing institutional arguments for
the superiority of the political process as a protector of property rights, especially at the
state and federal level). For criticisms other than those advancedhere, see Somin, Takig
PropertyRights Seriously? at 28-30 (cited in note 12).
86 Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2108-14 (cited in note 35). See also Janice Nadler, Shari
Seidman Diamond, and Matthew M. Patton, Government Takings ofPrivateProperty,in
Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin, and Patrick J. Egan, eds, Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy 286 (Oxford 2008) (describing additional survey data on the use of
eminent domain for development that demonstrate its unpopularity).
87 Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2101-02 (cited in note 35).
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new laws turned out to be ineffective. They claimed to forbid economic development condemnations, but actually allowed them to
continue under other names, usually as "blight" condemnations
under definitions of blight that are so broad that virtually any
area qualifies.88 Some states did enact effective reform laws. But
the majority did not, especially those that had previously engaged in particularly large numbers of condemnations that
transferred land to private parties.8 9
Political ignorance played a major role in explaining this
pattern. A 2007 Saint Index survey found that only 21 percent of
Americans even knew whether their state had enacted property
rights reform legislation since Kelo, and only 13 percent both
knew the correct answer to the former question and also knew
whether their state had enacted an effective reform law or not. 90
Even these figures likely overstate the true extent of public
knowledge, since some survey respondents probably got the right
answer by guessing.91
If the effectiveness of the political process was severely limited even in a situation where abuses were highly publicized and
public opinion was overwhelmingly supportive of reform, it is
likely to be even less effective in cases that are less widely
known, and public opinion is more evenly divided. Given the
complexity and low public visibility of many restrictions on property rights, it is unlikely that the political process can effectively
monitor most of them.
3.

Information shortcuts.

Some scholars argue that political ignorance need not be a
major concern because voters can use "information shortcuts" to
make good decisions even if they know very little about politics. 92
88 See id at 2120-53 (surveying the federal and state laws enacted in response to
Kelo). For other assessments of post-Kelo reform legislation that also find many of them
to be ineffective, see EdwardJ. IUpez, R. ToddJewell, andNoelD. Campbell, Passa Law,
Any Law, Fast!State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash, 5 Rev L & Econ 101
(2009); Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State
Responses to Kelo, 17 Sup Ct Econ Rev 237(2009); Timothy Sandefur, The 'Backlash"So
Far: WillAmericans GetMeaningfldEminentDomainReform. 2006 Mich St L Rev 709.
But see Lynn E. Blais, UrbanRevitalizationin the Post-Kelo Era,34 Fordham Urban LJ
657 (2007) (claiming that many of the reforms go too far).
89 Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2117-20 (cited in note 35).
9 Id at 2155-56.
91 Id at 2156-57.

9 For examples of this scholarship, see generally Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning
Voter(Chicago 1991); Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The DemocraticDilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (Cambridge 1998); Philip E. Con-
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Elsewhere, I have explained why information shortcuts are likely
to be ineffective if, as is often the case, voters lack even basic political knowledge, and often do not choose their shortcuts in a
rational manner.93 Here, I will only note that the complexity and
low visibility of most local land use policies make it especially
difficult for voters to use information shortcuts to offset their ignorance. These factors exacerbate various other reasons why information shortcuts are often unusually difficult to use effectively in local politics. 9 4 The failure of shortcuts to enable voters to
force through effective post-Kelo reform statutes in most states,
despite the support of overwhelming majorities for such reforms,
is a particularly telling indicator of their shortcomings in this
field.95

C.

The Problem of Externalities

One area where local government officials might have a
genuine knowledge advantage is with respect to restrictions on
property rights that control externalities. An externality arises
when an individual's actions affect others positively or negatively
without "internalizing" the costs or benefits that he or she creates. 96 For example, a "negative externality" occurs if a property
owner's activities on his land might generate pollution that
harms his neighbors. Even if the owner is well aware of the pollution, he might not consider its costs in deciding what to do on
his land. Landowners can also create "positive externalities," as,
for example, when an attractive-looking house creates aesthetic
benefits for neighbors and onlookers.
While landowners are likely to have greater knowledge than
government officials of the externalities their activities create,
lack of internalization might prevent them from acting on that
knowledge. Government officials, meanwhile, might have greater
verse, PopularRepresentationandthe Distributionof Information, in John A. Ferejohn
and James H. Kuklinski, eds, Information andDemocraticProcesses 369 (Illinois 1990).
93 See, for example, Somin, 18 Critical Rev at 265-67 (cited in note 76) (discussing

the flaws of many different shortcut mechanisms); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance andthe
Democratic Ideal, 12 Critical Rev 413, 419-35 (1998). See generally Somin, Democracy
andPoiticallgnorance
(cited in note 72).
9 See David Schleicher, Whyis thereno PartisanCompetition in City CouncilElec-

tions?The Role ofElection Law, 23 J L & Politics 419, 448-59 (2007) (discussing some of
these problems).
95 For a discussion of this aspect of post-Kelo reform, see Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at
2160-63 (cited in note 35).
96 For a helpful explanation, see Bryan Caplan, Externalities,in David R. Henderson,
ed, The Concise Encyclopedia ofEconomics 169-72 (Liberty Fund 2008).
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knowledge than federal judges, and may be more willing to act
on that knowledge than landowners. For this reason, it could be
argued that federal judges should give local governments a free
hand in restricting property rights when doing so might diminish
negative externalities or promote positive ones.
This argument, however, is subject to several significant caveats. First, the private sector has many effective mechanisms
for diminishing externalities. Small and medium-size externalities that affect neighbors can often be addressed through bargaining between them, as R.H. Coase explained in a classic article. 97 Real-world neighbors routinely engage in such bargaining
and also rely on a variety of social sanctions and norms to effectively control externalities.98
Private initiative has also evolved methods for addressing
larger-scale externality problems. For example, over 50 million
Americans now live in various types of private planned communities, which often effectively take on externality-reducing functions traditionally associated with local government.99 The private sector has also evolved mechanisms for alleviating the negative externalities caused by "holdout" problems that might make
it difficult to assemble land for private development projects-a
standard justification for Kelo-style takings. Developers can
avoid such difficulties by using secret purchases to assemble
property.100 This approach has worked well in many important
assembly projects, including those undertaken by Harvard University and the Disney Corporation. 101 Secret assembly has many
advantages over the use of eminent domain, including the fact
that it takes better account of the "subjective value" of the property in question, and is less vulnerable to interest group capture. 102
It is important to remember that externality problems are
often the result of insufficient reliance on private property rights,
not an excess thereof. For example, many environmental externalities affect government-owned resources such as publicly
owned lakes and streams, or resources with no clear owner at all.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
For a thorough description, see generally Robert C. Ellickson, Orderwithout Law:
How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard 1991).
9 Robert H. Nelson, PrivateNeighborhoodsand the 7ransformationof Local Go vernment(Urban Institute 2005).
1oo See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 25-34 (cited in note 63); Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev
at 203-09 (cited in note 13).
101 Somin, 15 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 206 (cited in note 13).
102 See sources cited in Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 25-34 (cited in note 63).
97

98
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The creation of new private property rights can help alleviate
these dangers, often more efficiently than government regulation. 103
From the standpoint of knowledge and expertise, private
sector efforts to alleviate externalities can more effectively take
advantage of local knowledge than government regulators can.
The general analysis of local knowledge presented above applies

in this field as well. 10 4
Finally, the mere fact that the private sector has failed to
address an externality does not mean that government restraints
on property rights will necessarily succeed in doing so. Indeed,
many restrictions on property rights are likely to exacerbate externality problems rather than alleviate them. For example, Kelo-style "economic development" takings often cause negative
environmental externalities by subsidizing inefficient development projects and targeting open space and private conservation
areas.105 Given the complexity of externality issues and the presence of extensive voter ignorance, we cannot assume that the
political process will effectively confine restrictions on property
rights to cases where there are genuine externalities that cannot
be effectively handled by the private sector.
Even if the possible presence of externalities justifies some
degree of judicial deference to the expertise of local officials, it
cannot justify such deference in property rights cases across the
board. Since many government restrictions on property rights
are driven by interest group power rather than any objective
consideration of externality effects and may actually exacerbate
externality problems,106 a degree of judicial skepticism is warranted. At the very least, judges should not use externalities as a
justification for deference unless the government has provided
substantial evidence showing that an externality exists and that
restrictions on property rights are necessary to alleviate it.

103 See generally Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Leal, 1reeMarketEnvironmental-

ism (Palgrave 2d ed 2001).
1o4 See Part II.A.
105 See lya Somin andJonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs ofKelo:Economic Development Takings and En vironmental Protection, 84 Wash U L Rev 623, 641-65 (2006)

(giving examples).
106 See the discussion of interest group dynamics in Part L.A-B, and the related points
on the impact of political ignorance in making it difficult to control such abuses.
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D. Comparisons with Other Constitutional Rights
If taken seriously, the local expertise argument against federal judicial protection of property rights also applies to other
constitutional rights. Fourth Amendment rights against "unreasonable" searches and seizures and First Amendment rights to
freedom of speech and religion often involve issues where conditions vary in different regions and local officials often have
10 In each of these fields,
greater expertise than federal judges.o
federal courts routinely intervene to protect individual rights
despite the superior expertise of local officials.
Some scholars have argued that property rights differ from
other constitutional rights issues because the content of property
rights is determined, in the first instance, by state law. 108 They
contend that state officials and courts therefore have an unusually great expertise advantage over federal courts in this field.109
But the difficulties federal courts confront in this area are no
greater than those they face in many other fields where federal
judges must interpret state law.
1. Fourth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the reasonableness
of a search often depends on "the facts of a particular case in
light of the distinctive features and events of the community" on
which local judges and "law enforcement officers" may have specialized "expertise."11o Often, local officials and police have far

greater knowledge about "the distinctive features and events of
the community" relevant to the constitutionality of a particular
search than federal judges. Indeed, the "reasonableness" of a
search may depend on local conditions to an even greater degree
than property rights decisions do. Whether a search is reasonable may depend on conditions that vary from house to house and
hour to hour. Yet federal judges routinely address these issues,
and do not simply defer to the views of local officials.

107 US Const Amend IV.

1os See Sterk, 114 Yale L J203 (citedin note 5); Michelman, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at
324-28 (cited in note 5); Durchslag, 59 Md L Rev at 494 (cited in note 5).
109 See Sterk, 114 Yale L J at 226-35 (cited in note 5).
110 Ornelasv UnitedStates,517 US 690, 699 (1996). See also UnitedStates v Brown,
310 Fed Appx 776, 778 (6th Cir 2009) (noting relevance of "understanding [of]local conditions"in determining whether a search is reasonable); UnitedStates vAtcd2ey, 474 F3d
840, 847 (6th Cir 2007) (same).
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There is no reason why deference to local government expertise should be any greater with respect to property rights in a
building than with regard to searches of that very same property.
As Justice Clarence Thomas noted in his dissent in Kelo, the
Court takes a nondeferential approach "when the issue is only
whether the government may search a home. Yet today the
Court tells us that we are not to 'second-guess the City's considered judgments,' . . . when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing
down petitioners' homes.... Though citizens are safe from the
government in their homes, the homes themselves are not."111

2.

The First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

Under the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
whether a religious display on government property violates the
Clause depends in part on whether a "reasonable observer ...
aware of the history and context of the community and forum in
which [the conduct occurred]" would view the practice as communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.112 Presumably, local and state officials are more
likely to be knowledgeable about "the history and context of the
community" than federal judges. Yet the latter routinely address
these questions.
Recently, a federal district court ruled that the placement of
a cross on public property in Utah was not an establishment of
religion in part because the majority of Utah's population consists of Mormons who do not consider the cross to be a symbol of
their faith. 113 Therefore, a reasonable observer familiar with local
conditions would recognize that the Utah state government,
heavily influenced as it is by the state's Mormon majority, would
not try to "endorse" the cross as a religious symbol. 114 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this reasoning, concluding that "the fact that most Utahns do not revere the cross as a
symbol of their faith does not mean that the State cannot violate
the Establishment Clause by conduct that has the effect of promoting the cross and, thereby, the religious groups that revere

111 Kelo, 545 US at 518 (Thomas dissenting).

CapitolSquare vPinette, 515 US 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor concurring).
American Atheists v Duncan, 528 F Supp 2d 1245 (D Utah 2007), revd, 616 F3d
1145 (10th Cir 2010).
112
113

114 Id at 1258-59.
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The appellate court reasoned that Utah Mormons may impute at least some religious significance to the cross, and that
religious minorities in Utah might reasonably see the placement
of the cross as an endorsement of Christianity.116
Presumably, local Utah officials would have greater expertise on such matters than federal judges; they would be in a better position to understand the nuances of Mormon beliefs and the
perceptions of Utah's religious minorities. Yet federal judges did
not hesitate to address these questions and did not defer to the
perceptions of local policymakers.
it."115

3.

Freedom of speech.

Variations in local conditions are also often relevant to assessing free speech claims under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has ruled that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."117 Whether
any given speech is likely to incite or produce "imminent lawless
action" may well depend on variations in local conditions, such as
the state of opinion in the local community and the popularity
and influence of the speaker. Local and state officials are likely
to be better informed about such matters than federal judges.
Similarly, racially charged speech may be more likely to
qualify as an effort at intimidation or threat of violence in a state
with a long history of racial oppression. In 1995, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the state's ban on cross-burning against
First Amendment challenge in part because "[a]n unauthorized
cross-burning by intruders in one's own yard . . . has been inex-

tricably linked in this state's historyto sudden and precipitous
violence-lynchings, shootings, whippings, mutilations, and
home-burnings."11 8 In his dissent in Virginia v Black,119 Justice
Thomas cited Virginia's history of racist violence and segregation
as a reason for concluding that cross -burning in that state should
be viewed as an effort at intimidation rather than speech, and
115 American Atheists v Duncan, 616 F3d 1145, 1163-64 (10th Cir 2010), amended
and supersededby American Atheists vDavenport,2010 WL 5151630 (10th Cir Dec 20,
2010) (The relevant portion of the original opinion was not altered.).
116 American Atheists vDuncan, 616 F3d at 1164.
117 Brandenburgv Ohio, 395 US 444, 447 (1969).
118 State v TBD, 656 So2d 479, 481 (Fla 1995) (emphasis added).
119 538 US 343 (2003).
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therefore justifying a broad ban on the practice imposed by the
state legislature.120 Presumably, Florida and Virginia legislators
are more knowledgeable about their states' particular histories
and conditions than most federal judges are. But federal courts
have not hesitated to address cases involving racist speech, usually with little or no deference to state officials' judgments.1 2 1
As this Article goes to press, the state of Montana is arguing
in federal court that its campaign finance law restricting spending on political speech by corporations and unions should be
judged differently from those of other states because of Montana's specific history of special interest influence in the electoral
process. 122 Here too, state officials are likely to be more knowledgeable than federal judges. Yet it will be surprising if the latter decide to defer to the former.
These examples are just a few of the areas where federal
courts routinely review the constitutionality of state officials' decisions despite the fact that the latter probably have superior
knowledge and expertise on relevant variations in local conditions. The usual justification for this nondeferential posture is
that the expertise of state officials is counterbalanced by the
danger that state and local governments might infringe on the
rights of politically weak groups and minorities, often for the
purpose of benefiting the politically powerful. 123 Superior expertise may be a danger rather than an asset if it is put in the service of efforts to repress the politically weak for the benefit of the
powerful.
Yet, as discussed above, 124 the same danger exists in the
case of state and local government infringements on property
rights. Here too, officials often victimize minorities and the politically weak for the benefit of the powerful. Moreover, with prop120 Id at 391-95 (Thomas dissenting).
121 See, for example, id; Brandenburg,395 US 444; RA V v St Paul,505 US 377 (1992)
(invalidating statutes banning hate speech and advocacy of racially motivated crimes, on
grounds that the proscribed speech was not so likely to spur imminent violence as to
justify the restraint on free expression).
122 See Jess Bravin, Election 2010-Montana:A Lone Stance on AdSpending-One
State Is in a Fightto Uphold Curbs on Corporateand Union Punding That Are Threatened by a Supreme CourtRuling,Wall St J A5 (Oct 12, 2010).
123 For classic arguments contending that judicial review is needed to protect minority
rights, see generally John Hart Ely, DemocracyandDistrust:ATheoryofJudicialRevbw
105-34 (Harvard 1980). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation andReconstruction (Yale 2000) (documenting how, during Reconstruction and after, judicial
review under the Bill of Rights was recast as a tool for protecting the rights of vulnerable
minorities).
124 See Part L.A and accompanying notes.
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erty rights-unlike political speech and Fourth Amendment
rights-federal judicial intervention often empowers private actors who have greater knowledge of relevant local conditions
than government officials do. In that respect, the expertise-based
argument for judicial deference is actually weaker in the case of
property rights than with respect to the enforcement of most other constitutional rights against subnational governments. 12 5
4.

Are property rights special because state law determines
their content?

Some scholars argue that property rights differ from other
constitutional rights because "[p]roperty . . . owes both its exist-

ence and its contours to positive law, local positive law. Property
simply does not exist in the absence of state law."12 6 Because the
content of property rights is determined by state law, it may be
that state courts and legislatures have an unusually great expertise advantage in this field, a point emphasized in an important
2004 article by Professor Stewart Sterk. 127
Before a federal court can decide whether a newly enacted
state or local regulation effects a regulatory taking, it must first
determine what rights the landowner had under preexisting
state law, which may be a complex undertaking.128 If the owner
did not previously have the right to use the property in ways forbidden by the new law, there can be no regulatory taking. By
contrast, other constitutional decisions involving state laws only
require federal courts to interpret the meaning of the challenged
law itself without having to consider "state law before enactment
of the challenged statute"-a possibly easier task. 129 State courts
and legislatures are, it is contended, more knowledgeable about
the meaning of preexisting state law. 130
125 It could be arguedthat state or local governments'reasons for infringing on property rights are more complex than their reasons for violating the Establishment Clause or
free speech rights. But that is not systematically true. Throughout history, governments
have cited a wide range of complex reasons for regulating speech and religion, including
improving public morals, preventing the spread of dangerous ideas (heresy, communism,
racism, Nazism, and so forth), preventing interference with government policy, building
community unity, and numerous others In many cases, these rationales for government
intervention are as much or more complex than government regulation of property rights.
126 Durchslag, 59 Md L Rev at 494 (cited in note 5). See also Michelman, 35 Wm &
Mary L Rev at 305-07 (cited in note 5) (making similar points); Sterk, 114 Yale L J at
326-35 (cited in note 5) (same).
127 Sterk, 114 Yale LJ at 326-29 (cited in note 5).
128 Id at 326-28.
129 Id at 228.
13o Id.
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This argument is ultimately unpersuasive for several reasons. First, it only applies to regulatory takings cases where the
rights of the landowner under preexisting state law are in dispute. It does not apply to most public use cases, including Kelo,
which usually arise in situations where the state seeks to take
title to property by eminent domain, thereby conceding from the
outset the preexisting rights of the owner. It also does not apply
to regulatory takings cases where the preexisting rights of the
owner are relatively clear.
Even in cases where preexisting legal rights are in dispute,
it is not clear that the interpretive challenges involved are any
greater than those federal courts routinely face in other contexts.
For example, determining whether a seemingly neutral law is
actually an effort to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or
some other forbidden classification requires federal courts to not
only interpret the challenged law but also consider whether its
enactment departed from standard legislative practices and
whether previous laws demonstrate a pattern of efforts to target
the group in question.' Surely, local and state officials have at
least as great an advantage in making such evaluations of previous local laws as they do in determining whether a landowner
had certain rights under preexisting state property law.
In diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts must routinely
interpret a wide range of state laws when the parties to the litigation are from different states and one of them chooses to litigate the case in federal court. 132 Some of the state statutory and
common law that federal courts must interpret in such cases is
extremely complex, as much or more so than that involved in
property rights cases. It is true that such cases usually involve
only interpretations of current state law rather than previous
rules. But interpreting one highly complex law might be more
difficult than interpreting two simpler ones.
It is also important to recognize that there is considerable
standardization of basic property law across state and local lines.
For example, nearly all common law jurisdictions divide property
into a few basic types of estates with standardized packages of

131 See Vilage ofArlington Heights vMetro HousingDevelopmentCorp, 429 US 252,
264-68 (1977) (explaining standards that apply to such cases).
132 See US Const Art 111, § 2 (creating diversity jurisdiction for federal courts).
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rights. 133 Standardization is also promoted by the influence of the
Restatement of Property Law and various treatises. 134
Furthermore, the mere fact that a new statute or regulation
was thought necessary to constrain a landowner's use of his
property is in itself some indication that he had the right to use
the land in the now-forbidden manner previously. Otherwise,
why could not the government simply impose the same result by
using preexisting legal rules? In such cases, it might well be reasonable for judges to put the burden of proof on the state or local
government to show that its newly enacted regulations, contrary
to appearances, did not abrogate any preexisting rights of the
landowner. To the extent that state officials genuinely have superior expertise in analyzing the structure of state law, federal
courts can get the benefit of that expertise by requiring them to
provide the relevant evidence and analysis.
Finally, the assumption that property rights are merely the
creation of state law without any intrinsic meaning in federal
constitutional law is a flawed one. In reality, the institution of
private property long predates the existence of American states,
or indeed modern states of any kind.135 The text, original meaning, and historical understanding of the Takings Clause are in
large part based on natural law notions of property rights that
hold that such rights have a moral basis and origin independent
of state law. 136 It is true that the Supreme Court has noted that
"[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution" but instead "stem from an independent source such as
state-law rules." 137 But it has never held that state authority in
this field is unlimited or that state law is the exclusive source of
the definition of property rights. 138 If it were, a state could cut off
133 See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry M. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law
ofProperty: The Numerus Clausus Pinciple,110 Yale L J 1 (2000).
134 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity andSpeech: The Legacy of PruneYard v Robins, 64 U Chi L Rev 21, 41 (1997).
135 See RichardPipes, PropertyandFreedom 25-63 (AlfredA. Knopf 1999) (describing
historical origins of property rights).
136 See, for example, Claeys, 2004 Mich St L Rev 877 (cited in note 8); Ely, The Guardian ofEvery Other Right at 42-59 (cited in note 8); Epstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 40 (cited
in note 134); Jennifer Nedelsky, PrivatePropertyand the Limits ofAmerican Constitutionalism: The MadisonianFramework and Its Legacy 103-104, 152-53 (Chicago 1990)
(discussing the "conventional wisdom" of the Founding era, that property was a natural
right).
137 Board ofRegents vRoth, 408 US 564, 577 (1972).
138 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty,86 Va L Rev
885, 942-99 (2000) (arguing that the constitutional definition of property under the
Court's jurisprudence is a mixture of state and federal doctrines).

53]

FEDERALISMAND PROPERTY RIGHTS

87

all regulatory takings or public use claims by future property
owners (though not current ones) simply by passing a statute
stating that all property rights in land are subject to whatever
regulations the state legislature might choose to enact in the future, without compensation.
In sum, it is difficult to use expertise-based federalism arguments as a justification for judicial deference on property
rights without also undercutting the justification for judicial review of many other constitutional rights. One can consistently
use such arguments to advocate cutting back on judicial review
of state government actions across the board,13 9 but not to justify
selective deference in the field of property rights.
III. CONCLUSION
Federalism is not a good justification for judicial deference to
state and local governments on property rights. Interjurisdictional competition often fails to provide effective protection for
property rights because of the immobility of land. While state
and local officials may well have greater expertise on local land
use issues than do federal judges, the protection of property
rights by the latter empowers property owners, who generally
have more relevant local knowledge than government planners.
Moreover, widespread political ignorance and irrationality undercut the extent to which political decision making reflects genuine expertise and diminishes the ability of the political process
to prevent abuses.
If taken seriously, the federalism rationale for judicial deference on property rights applies to a wide range of other constitutional rights. It therefore serves more as a general argument
against federal judicial review of state policy than as a narrowly
targeted critique of judicial protection for property rights.
The debate over judicial protection for property rights will
no doubt continue. Many of the points at issue do not depend on
appeals to federalism. Nonetheless, the federalism argument has
been advanced by both the Supreme Court and several prominent scholars.140 For that reason among others, it is important
that we recognize the shortcomings of the federalist case against
139 For examples of arguments against judicial review generally, see Mark Tushnet,

Taking the ConstitutionA wayfrom the Cours(Princeton 1999); Jeremy Waldron, Law
andDisagreement(Oxford1999); and Robert H. Bork, SlouchingTowards Gomorrah 96119, 196 (ReganBooks 1996).
140 See cases and works cited in the Introduction.
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judicial enforcement of property rights. When it comes to property, the most thoroughgoing decentralization is also often the
best.141 And that means protecting property rights against all
levels of government.

141 See

the discussion of "federalism all the way down" in Part II.B.

